Abstract. This is a successive oligopoly model with two varieties of a final product. Downstream firms choose one variety to sell on a final market. Upstream firms specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for one variety, but they also produce the input for the other variety at an extra cost. We show that as more downstream firms choose one particular variety, more upstream firms specialize in the input specific to that variety, and vice-versa. Multiple equilibria may result, and the softening effect of product differentiation on competition might not be strong enough to induce maximal differentiation. JEL Classification: L11, L13, L23 Diffe´renciation des produits dans des oligopoles verticaux successifs. On examine un mode`le d'oligopole successif dans lequel il y a deux varie´te´s de produit final. Les entreprises en aval choisissent une varie´te´pour l'e´couler dans un marche´final. Les entreprises en amont se spe´cialisent dans la production d'un intrant de´fini spe´cifique-ment pour la production d'une varie´te´, mais elles produisent aussi l'intrant spe´cifique-ment de´fini pour l'autre varie´te´a`un couˆt additionnel. On montre que davantage de firmes en amont se spe´cialisent dans la production de l'intrant spe´cifique a`une varie´teĺ orsque davantage de firmes en aval choıˆsissent cette varie´te´. De multiples e´quilibres peuvent exister, et l'effet adoucissant de la diffe´renciation des produits sur la concurrence peut ne pas eˆtre suffisamment puissant pour engendrer une diffe´renciation maximale.
Introduction
In this paper we consider two vertically linked industries and address the following question: How does the endogenous choice of input specificity in the upstream industry affect the choice of product differentiation in the downstream industry? In particular, we consider industries with the following features. The downstream industry produces a final product that can be marketed under two possible differentiated varieties. Intuitively, one understands that, absent any other consideration, this industry is driven towards a situation where firms split equally (or 'almost equally' if there is an odd number of them) between the two varieties in order to soften competition.
However, this intuition may prove wrong when we also take into account an upstream industry that produces an essential input for the downstream industry and that also has to take its stand on the two varieties. The reason is the following. Although the use of so-called flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) becomes increasingly widespread, 1 economies of scale are still present in many industries. It is thus reasonable to assume that the input is more costly to produce when it has to fit two differentiated varieties rather than a single one. As a result, adopting the terminology of Eaton and Schmitt (1994) , upstream firms choose to develop one basic product (that fits one particular variety of the final good) and then produce, with an extra unit cost, one variation of that basic product (in order to fit the other variety of the final good). The extra cost might be due to the fact that more raw material is needed for each unit of the input to be transformed into the other variety. It might also be the consequence of a degradation of performance of the input when it is transformed into the other variety.
Reconsidering variety choices by downstream firms in such a broader context, we can conjecture that these choices will be driven not only by competition on the final market, but also by cost considerations linked to the choices made by firms in the upstream industry. In particular, we are in the presence of two 'market-thickness principles' (see McLaren 2000) : on the one hand, when a large number of upstream firms choose to conform with a particular variety, downstream firms are more attracted towards this variety because of relatively lower input costs; on the other hand, upstream firms are more likely to conform with a variety that has been selected by a large number of downstream firms, since it enlarges the market for their basic product. Because the two principles are mutually reinforcing, a force exists that opposes the desire to reduce competition and that might drive the industries towards an absence of product differentiation.
Our analysis builds on two different strands of the literature in industrial organization. First, a number of recent contributions have stressed the importance of the endogenous choice of input specificity by upstream firms. Although the effects of such an endogenous choice are studied not on downstream product differentiation but on the incentives for vertical integration and vertical foreclosure, these papers provide useful insights for the present analysis. Choi and Yi (2000) consider a situation, similar to ours, in which downstream firms produce (exogenously) differentiated products and, as a result, demand differentiated inputs from upstream firms. As they explain it, 'This may be due to the fact that they employ different manufacturing processes or that differentiated outputs simply require different specifications of inputs.' In contrast with the existing literature, they assume that the upstream firms make decisions with respect to the specification of the input demanded by the downstream firms. In particular, upstream firms may decide to supply a specialized input that is dedicated to a single downstream firm. As the latter decision can serve as a commitment to foreclose other downstream firms, Choi and Yi's formulation provides a suitable setting where the issue of vertical foreclosure can be addressed. Church and Gandal (2000) adopt a similar approach. They consider markets characterized by two competing systems, which consist of a hardware good and complementary software. As the hardware systems are (exogenously) differentiated, software firms can decide to make the software available either in a format compatible with only one hardware system or in formats compatible with both systems. In such a market, foreclosure can arise when an integrated hardware/software firm makes its software incompatible with the rival hardware system, thereby reducing the value of this hardware to consumers who care for software variety. Finally, McLaren (2000) also considers the incentive for vertical integration (though not for the 'foreclosure' motive) in a setting where downstream firms produce (exogenously) differentiated outputs and upstream firms decide about the degree of asset specificity of their input. The crux of his model is another type of 'market-thickness principle': by remaining unintegrated, an upstream/downstream pair creates a positive externality for the rest of the industry by 'thickening' the market for inputs and thus reducing the possibility of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour.
Our analysis is also closely related to the economic geography literature, which, starting with the pioneering work of Marshall (1920) and Hotelling (1929) , studies product differentiation through the physical location of firms. A well-known result in this tradition is the principle of maximal differentiation established by d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) : in the linear city model (with quadratic transportation costs), firms choose to locate at the extreme points of the city. There exist, however, forces that oppose maximal (or any) product differentiation. Numerous contributions stress the impact of positive (Marshallian) externalities that induce firms to locate near one another. The general idea is that, for given inputs, the output of an individual firm is larger the larger is the aggregate output of other firms producing the same good in the same locale. Yet Helpman and Krugman (1985) point out that Marshall's explanation is incomplete: external economies can arise from proximity to specialized inputs only if there is a natural comparative advantage for the production of these inputs in the region. As Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) nicely put it, 'The puzzle is simply rolled back to the previous production stage: Why do the producers of inputs locate in the region?' They develop, therefore, the argument that the equilibrium locations of firms and their input suppliers are interdependent. The similarity between this argument and our conjecture is further emphasized by Venables (1996) , who argues: 'If industries are vertically linked through an input-output structure, then the downstream industry forms the market for upstream. Market access considerations then draw the upstream industry to locations where there are relatively many downstream firms. In addition to this demand linkage between industries, there is also a cost linkage. Firms in the downstream industry will have lower costs if they locate where there are relatively many upstream firms-they save trade costs on their intermediate inputs. Putting the demand linkage and the cost linkage together creates a force for the agglomeration of activity in a single location. ' In sum, the first strand of literature shares our interest for the endogenous 'design specificity' of inputs (i.e., the specificity resulting from the design process per se), but it is not concerned with product differentiation on the final market. On the other hand, the second strand of literature shares our intuition about the 'market-thickness principles,' but it focuses on the 'site specificity' of inputs (i.e., the specificity resulting from physical proximity). Our goal is to bridge a gap between the two strands and investigate how demand and cost linkages a`la Venables (1996) affect the 'location' of firms in a product rather than in a geographical space.
To this end, we build a simple static three-stage model where, first, firms in both industries choose (simultaneously) between two possible varieties and, second, upstream firms compete on their markets before downstream firms fix their output. We show that the number of downstream firms that choose one particular variety increases with the number of upstream firms that specialize in the input that is specific to that variety, and vice-versa. We establish that three types of equilibria might occur (and might coexist): there can be 'maximal' differentiation (firms split equally between the two varieties), 'minimal' differentiation (upstream and downstream firms select the same variety), or 'partial' differentiation (most -but not all -upstream and/or downstream firms choose the same variety). The existence of the latter type of asymmetric equilibria is rather striking in a framework that is ex ante completely symmetric.
The construction industry provides an illustration of these possible equilibria. Traditionally, the supply of building materials has been characterized by the exchange of standardized inputs, resulting in a low degree of customization of final construction projects (see Dubois and Gadde 2000) . This situation corresponds to minimal differentiation and has long been preferred because it secured for the downstream firms the cheapest source of inputs (see Cox and Thompson 1997) . However, an increasing trend towards customization has been observed recently. For instance, Voordijk, de Haan, and Joosten (2000) report how the deregulation of the construction industry in the Netherlands has radically transformed the nature of competition. The traditional 'supplier-dominated system,' leading to low-cost standardized buildings, is increasingly replaced by a 'designer-dominated system,' which specializes in specific customized designs, closer to final customers' demands. The latter situation corresponds more closely to our maximal or partial differentiation equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the modelling framework is described. The three-stage game is analysed in section 3. We present our main results in section 4. In section 5 we conclude and proposes some directions for further research.
The model
We study a successive oligopoly model with two adjacent industries. In the downstream industry, a set N of n firms produces some product to be sold on a final market. One can think of the architects in the construction industry. These 'final producers' (as we choose to call them hereafter) have to choose under which variety, or customized design in our example, to market their product. For simplicity, we limit the choice to two horizontally differentiated varieties, noted a and b. Once the final producers have made their choice, the industry is partitioned into the two subsets N a and
We adopt the following notation. Let y ik denote the quantity of
y ik , the total quantity produced of variety k, and Y Ài k P j2N k ; j6 ¼i y jk . We use a system of demand functions for differentiated products derived from the quadratic, separable utility function of a representative consumer who exhibits love for variety (see Shubik 1980 or Singh and Vives 1984) . Accordingly, we write the inverse demand schedule as follows:
. when the n final producers choose to produce the same variety k (meaning that N k ¼ N and that the other variety is not produced), the price on the market for variety k is given by p k ¼ 1 À Y k ; . when the final producers choose to produce different varieties, prices on the market are given by We assume that final producers produce the final good by transforming a single intermediate good on a one-for-one basis. The marginal cost of the final producers only consists of the price paid for the intermediate good (other specific costs are assumed to be zero).
The intermediate good is supplied by the upstream industry, which consists of a set M of m firms. The production technology for the intermediate good assumes some degree of 'variety specificity.' That is, each upstream firm has to design its production process in conformity with a specific variety of the final product (we say in the sequel that they choose to 'produce for' variety a or for variety b). As a result, if the intermediate good is to be transformed into that specific variety, the marginal cost of production is equal to c, whereas if it has to be transformed into the other variety, an extra 'adaptation' cost t is to be incurred, and the total marginal cost of production amounts to c þ t (naturally, we assume c þ t < 1 to avoid no-trade situations). In the sequel, without any loss of generality, we set c ¼ 0. In the construction industry, the suppliers of building materials (i.e., the upstream firms, or 'suppliers' for short) do indeed incur extra costs when architects stop relying on standardized materials.
We study a dynamic game where product positioning decisions (which variety to produce, or to design the intermediate good for) precede production decisions (how much of the intermediate and final goods to produce). More precisely, suppliers and final producers play a three-stage game. At the first stage, suppliers and final producers simultaneously choose one variety. At the second stage, knowing the decisions taken at the first stage, suppliers set the quantity of the input specific to each variety. At the third stage, final producers observe the suppliers' input choices and decide how much of the final good to produce. The game is solved for its subgame-perfect equilibria by the method of backward induction. Although the modelling framework has been kept as simple as possible, the three-stage game is rather intricate to solve. We focus, therefore, on equilibria in pure strategies.
Variety choices
As we will now show, two conflicting forces affect final producers' variety choices. On the one hand, there is a product differentiation effect: final producers have an incentive to choose different varieties in order to soften competition on the final market. On the other hand, there is a network effect:
2 if more final producers choose a specific variety, they induce more suppliers to choose that variety as well, which reduces the price of the input specific to that particular variety.
To characterize equilibria, we introduce the following terminology. Considering a particular industry, we refer to minimal differentiation when all firms choose the same variety, to maximal differentiation when firms split equally between the two varieties, and to partial differentiation when firms split unequally between the two varieties. Note that, to simplify the exposition, we restrict our attention to industries with an even number of firms. As discussed below, this assumption does not affect our main results in any fundamental way. Let us now examine the three stages of the game.
Third stage
Let w a and w b denote the prices of the intermediate input to be transformed in either variety a or b (with w a , w b < 1). Suppose that the two varieties have been adopted by a positive number of final producers. Typical firms i 2 N a and j 2 N b , respectively, face the following maximization programs:
The first-order conditions for profit maximization yield the following reaction functions:
Solving this system and using the symmetric positions of firms within each market, we derive the equilibrium quantities. To simplify the exposition, we identify a partition of the firms to Á n n a À n b , where
For a given Á n inherited from the first stage, every i 2 N a produces a quantity y a (Á n ), and every j 2 N b produces a quantity y b (Á n ):
In the case where all firms adopt the same variety (say, variety a), we set Á n ¼ n in expression (1) and disregard expression (2). Equilibrium profits are simply equal to the square of the equilibrium quantities:
We can also compute the inverse demands for the intermediate good to be transformed in each variety:
When a single variety is adopted by all final producers (say, variety k), we express similarly the inverse demand for the intermediate good to be transformed in variety k as
Second stage
Let us consider the case where the two varieties have been selected by a positive number of suppliers and final producers. Since suppliers have the opportunity to produce the intermediate input for either variety, we need a slightly different notation. According to the suppliers' variety choices, the upstream industry will be partitioned into the two subsets M a and M b (with
. Let x ik denote the quantity of the intermediate good produced by supplier i (i ¼ 1 , . . . , m) to be transformed into variety k (k ¼ a, b), and let the total quantity, X k , of the intermediate good to be transformed into variety k be defined as
Because of the linear technology in the final producers industry, we have the following market clearing conditions: Y a ¼ X a and Y b ¼ X b . Using the latter conditions and expressions (3) and (4), we can write the maximization program for a typical supplier i 2 M a as follows:
A similar expression obtains for the profit Å u j of a typical supplier j 2 M b . Maximizing Å u i with respect to x ia and x ib , and Å u j with respect to x ja and x jb , we get a system of four first-order conditions that we solve using the symmetry of the model (at the symmetric equilibrium, we have x ia ¼ x aa and x ib ¼ x ab , 8i 2 M a , and x ja ¼ x ba and x jb ¼ x bb , 8j 2 M b ). Whatever the adaptation cost t and the partition of the two industries, suppliers always find it profitable to produce for the variety they have selected (x aa , x bb > 0). However, for a given partition, there might be values of t that make production for the other variety not profitable. More precisely, there are three possible regimes: (i) for low values of the adaptation cost, all suppliers produce for both varieties; (ii) for high values, all suppliers produce for their own variety only; (iii) for intermediate values, firms having selected a particular variety produce for that variety only, whereas firms having selected the other variety produce for both varieties.
In what follows, we choose to focus on regions of parameters for which suppliers always find it profitable to produce for all existing varieties of the final product (i.e., we want regime (i) to apply in every subgame). In accordance with the previous argument, we therefore impose t < t max , where t max depends on the value of the other parameters (see section A.1.1 for an analytical expression). The motivation behind this simplifying assumption is twofold. First, in line with the discussion of section 1, we can say that the FMS used in the upstream industry makes sure that t is kept low enough, whatever the market conditions. Second, the task of proving existence of and characterizing variety choice equilibria turns out to be extremely tedious (and of rather limited interest) when all possible production equilibria in the upstream industry are considered (i.e., the three regimes we have just identified). 4 The reader should thus bear in mind that our main results are derived under the assumption that t < t max . However, it is possible to extend some of the results to the general setting; this will be indicated when appropriate.
We can now proceed with the solution of the second stage when t < t max . From the market-clearing conditions and the symmetry of final producers, we have y a ¼ (1/n a )(m a x aa þ m b x ba ) and
Plugging the latter expressions into (3) and (4), we get the equilibrium prices for the intermediate input to be transformed in the two varieties:
Not surprisingly, we observe that w a decreases with Á m : the more suppliers select variety a, the cheaper the input to be transformed into that variety. What is noteworthy is that equilibrium input prices do not depend on the final producers' variety choices (i.e., on the value of Á n ). This means that when final producers change their variety choices in the first stage, suppliers respond, in the second stage, by modifying input production in such a way that input prices are kept constant. To explain this result, observe that in (3) and (4) Á n affects the slope of the linear demand only. It is easy to show that with constant marginal costs, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is independent of the slope of the linear demand function. 5 We are now in a position to compute the equilibrium profits for any partition of the two industries in all possible regimes:
4 As explained in the resolution of the first stage, each partition (Á n , Á m ) has to be tested against (up to) four deviations each of which results in a new, different partition (i.e., (
, and (Á n , Á m þ 2)). Since the three regimes corresponding to each partition do not coincide, a complete analysis would force us to consider a long list of cases and subcases. 5 We thank the editor for pointing out this explanation. We note that this result also holds for the following general class of demand functions (which includes the linear and iso-elastic demands):
See the appendix for the analytical expressions (section A.1).
First stage
We look for Nash equilibria in the variety choice game, that is, for partitions of the two sets of firms such that no firm -either supplier or final producer -has an incentive to unilaterally switch varieties. There are potentially four conditions that have to be met to guarantee a Nash equilibrium. First, no final producer finds it profitable to deviate if and only if
Next, deviation by suppliers is unprofitable if and only if
Naturally, to analyse situations where all firms in an industry choose the same variety, we simply need to drop one or the other condition.
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We first establish a preliminary result that discards a whole class of variety choices as potential equilibria. We relegate the proof of this lemma and of all subsequent propositions to the appendix. LEMMA 1. There is no subgame-perfect equilibrium in which a particular variety is chosen by a majority of final producers and a minority of suppliers.
The intuition behind this result is simple. If a majority of final producers and a minority of suppliers adopt, say, variety a, each final producer with a wishes to adopt b instead because, for that variety, competition is softer and the input price is lower. Lemma 1 allows us to focus on cases where Á m and Á n have the same sign. Without any loss of generality, we consider non-negative values of Á m and Á n .
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To characterize variety choice equilibria, we need to develop the four conditions expressed above. For a given partition of the suppliers (Á m ), conditions Da and Db determine which partitions of final producers (Á n ) are immune to individual deviations. Similarly, for a given partition of the final producers (Á n ), conditions Ua and Ub determine which partitions of suppliers (Á m ) are immune to individual deviations. A variety choice equilibrium is a pair of values for Á m and Á n that are mutually consistent. We explore this in the next section, which collects our main results.
Main results
We first use the suppliers' equilibrium profits to develop conditions Ua and Ub. As described in section A.1.3, equilibrium in the upstream industry requires that Á m fall in the interval [ U(Á n ), U(Á n )], where the lower (upper) bound results from condition Ub (Ua). The left panel of figure 1 represents the resulting sequence of intervals. This sequence has the following properties. First, it is easily shown that, for every Á n , the corresponding interval is nonempty. This implies that there is no partition of the final producers' industry that makes an equilibrium in the upstream industry a priori impossible. Second, when Á n is increased from 0 to n, Ua and Ub define an increasing sequence of intervals. In other words, as more final producers choose variety a, equilibrium in the upstream industry requires that more suppliers also opt for that variety. The intuition is as follows. As Á n increases, the demand for the input specific to variety a expands, while the demand for the other input is reduced. It may then be profitable for a number of suppliers to switch from variety b to variety a. Yet as they do so, the relative price of input a decreases until no supplier is willing to switch varieties and equilibrium is restored.
A closer look at the sequence of intervals reveals some additional useful properties. Successive intervals have the same length (it can be checked that U(Á n ) ¼ U(Á n ) þ 2). Moreover, the two bounds increase with Á n at an increasing rate. The latter property implies that a switch by one final producer from variety b to variety a requires a corresponding switch in the upstream industry that becomes larger as more final producers choose variety a. At the limit, when all final producers choose variety a, all suppliers are clearly better off choosing variety a as well. We now use the final producers' equilibrium profits to develop conditions Da and Db (see section A.1.3). By analogy with the previous case, we would like to identify the value(s) of Á n that guarantee equilibrium among final producers for a given value of Á m . Analytical complexities prevent us from doing so. Yet we can explicit the inverse relationship and state that equilibrium on the downstream industry requires that Á m fall in the interval [D(Á n ), D(Á n )], where the lower (upper) bound results from condition Da (Db). The right panel of figure 1 exhibits the resulting sequence of intervals, which has similar properties to the one described for the upstream industry. First, when Á n is increased from 0 to n, Da and Db define an increasing sequence of non-empty intervals. The useful way to read this result is to say that, to preserve equilibrium in the downstream industry, Á n has to move in the same direction as Á m . As more suppliers choose variety a, the input specific to that variety becomes cheaper, which increases the attractiveness of that variety for final producers. Some of them thus switch from b to a and competition becomes relatively fiercer on the market for variety a until the final producers stop switching and equilibrium is restored.
Again, the sequence of intervals can be further characterized. First, successive intervals are adjacent: D(Á n ) ¼ D(Á n þ 2). Second, the two bounds increase with Á n at a decreasing rate, which mirrors what we observed in the upstream industry. We can, indeed, rephrase the result as follows: a switch by one supplier from variety b to variety a requires a corresponding switch in the downstream industry, which becomes larger as more suppliers choose variety a. The right panel of figure 1 represents the situation where all final producers choose the same variety when all suppliers do so as well. Another possibility, not represented in this figure, is that some final producers still prefer to produce variety b (for which competition is lower) although all suppliers choose variety a.
Collecting the previous results, we are able to prove not only the existence of an equilibrium, but also that there cannot be more than three simultaneous equilibria. Loosely speaking, the two sequences of intervals we have just derived always intersect, and they do so at most three times. The exact proof of these results is rather tedious and left for the appendix (section A.2.4). However, the flavour of the argument is easily grasped by superimposing the two panels of figure 1. We can state the next proposition. PROPOSITION 2 (Existence). (i) There exists a Nash equilibrium in the first-stage variety choice game. (ii) There can be at most three simultaneous equilibria: one with maximal differentiation in both industries, one with minimal differentiation in both industries, and one with partial differentiation in at least the downstream industry.
Let us now provide some further characterization of the set of equilibria. As far as the partial differentiation equilibrium is concerned, the complex form of the four conditions for equilibrium and the integer constraints prevent us from delineating the regions of parameters where such equilibrium occurs. We are able, however, to guarantee that there exist combinations of parameters for which partial differentiation is an equilibrium. 9 For instance, if both industries count ten firms, ¼ 0.95 and t ¼ 0.007 generate an equilibrium in which variety a is chosen by six final producers and eight suppliers. If the adaptation cost decreases to t ¼ 0.0042, then a slightly different equilibrium is generated, in which variety a is still chosen by six final producers, but also now by all ten suppliers. The latter example shows that partial differentiation can occur in the downstream industry, although all suppliers choose to design their production process in conformity with the same variety.
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Regarding the other two possible equilibria, we derive clear-cut characterization results, which we record in the next two propositions.
is a variety choice equilibrium for all admissible values of t and . There is no other equilibrium with either Á m ¼ 0 or Á n ¼ 0.
Proposition 3 tells us that maximal differentiation in one industry calls for maximal differentiation in the other industry as well.
11 Let us explain why this result holds for all admissible values of t and . Regarding the downstream industry, the intuition is straightforward. When suppliers split equally between the two varieties, input prices are the same for all t (see expression (5) with Á m ¼ 0) and the cost linkage disappears. Final producers' variety choices are then governed only by the product differentiation motive and we know that, in such cases, the only equilibrium for any value of is where the final producers also split equally between the two varieties.
9 Asymmetric equilibria of that type are not uncommon in (ex ante symmetric) settings where network effects are present. See, for example, Belleflamme, Picard, and Thisse (2000) for an example in economic geography, or Desruelle, Gaudet, and Richelle (1996) for an example in industrial organization. 10 As argued above, the reverse is not possible: if minimal differentiation prevails among final producers, the only possible equilibrium for suppliers is minimal differentiation as well (there is, indeed, no reason for them to design their production process in conformity with a variety that no final producer has chosen). 11 Maximal differentiation might not be an equilibrium for t ! t max . For values of t involving corner solutions in the production stages, a final producer might have an incentive to deviate: the increased competition it would face on the market it joins might be compensated for by less rationing and thus a cheaper source of input. We should also note the role played by our assumption that the two industries count an even number of firms. Because variety choices by individual firms have a discrete impact in our model, it is not surprising that slightly different results obtain when one or the other industry counts an odd number of firms. In particular, it can be shown that if at least one industry counts an odd number of firms, 'almost' maximal differentiation (Á m , Á n 2 {0, 1}) might not be an equilibrium for some values of and t. The reason is that, because of the link between the two industries, the slight imbalance of the partition in the 'odd' industry can make minimal differentiation unstable in the 'even' industry.
As far as suppliers are concerned, we need to decompose the effects of switching varieties to understand why such a move is not profitable in a situation of maximal differentiation. Suppose Á m ¼ Á n ¼ 0 and consider a supplier's switch from variety a to variety b. This supplier compares its profit after the switch -that is, 0) . Piecemeal comparisons reveal that the switch from a to b induces the following adjustments. As far as quantities are concerned, there is a transfer from market a to market b, in the sense that the decrease in the quantity sold on market a exactly matches the increase on market b: x aa (0, 0) À x ba (0, À2) ¼ x bb (0, À2) À x ab (0, 0) > 0. The same applies to markups, as the reduction in the markup on market a equals the increase in the markup on market b:
The previous results and a little manipulation allow us to rewrite the supplier's incentive to switch varieties in the following way:
The first term is a positive quantity effect, evaluated at the 'new' markups: because w b (À2) > w a (À2) À t, the increase in quantity on market b (i.e., ) is valued more than the equivalent decrease in quantity on market a (i.e., À). The second term is a negative price effect, evaluated at the 'old' quantities: because the supplier produces more for the variety on which it is specialized (x aa (0, 0) > x ab (0, 0)), the reduction in the markup on market a (i.e., À!) has a larger impact than the equivalent increase in the markup on market b (i.e., !).
The supplier has no incentive to switch if the price effect dominates the quantity effect, which can be rewritten as (using the definitions of ! and )
Because competition between suppliers is fiercer on market b after the switch than it was on market a before the switch, it is easily understood that x bb (0, À2) < x aa (0, 0), implying that the fraction on the left-hand side is larger than one. Moreover, recalling that w a (0) ¼ w b (0) and that w b increases with Á m , it is clear that w a (0) > w b (À2), meaning that the fraction on the right-hand side is smaller than one. We have thus demonstrated that in the case of maximal differentiation, suppliers have no incentive to switch varieties. Loosely speaking, what they would gain on the market they switch to does not make up for what they loose on the market they leave. This is true for all admissible values of t and .
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12 It can be shown that the disincentive to switch varieties increases with t and (i.e., suppliers have even more reasons to stick to their variety choice as the adaptation cost increases and as the final product becomes less differentiated).
We now express the conditions under which all suppliers choose to produce the same input, and all final producers choose the variety for which the specific input is produced.
PROPOSITION 4 (Minimal differentiation). Minimal differentiation in both industries (Á m ¼ m, Á n ¼ n) is a variety choice equilibrium if and only if, for a given degree of product differentiation , the adaptation cost t is large enough. More precisely, we need
It is instructive to note that " t t(, n) is a decreasing function of , meaning that the more varieties are differentiated (i.e., the lower ) the narrower the range of adaptation costs (t) supporting minimal differentiation as an equilibrium. 13 The intuition for this result is as follows. First, suppliers have no incentive to deviate: as all final producers choose a given variety, there is no demand for the input specific for the other variety. Second, final producers might have an incentive to deviate and become the sole producer of the other variety. This incentive increases with the degree of product differentiation () but decreases with the adaptation cost (t).
Alternatively, we could rephrase the result by writing that for minimal differentiation to be an equilibrium, the degree of final product differentiation must not be too large (i.e., must be large enough) for any given level of the adaptation cost (with t < t max ). Formally, we need
where " [t, n) 2 (0, 1) is clearly a decreasing function of t (as the adaptation cost increases, a final producer's deviation would be sanctioned by a larger cost disadvantage, which means that minimal differentiation can be sustained for lower values of ; reversing the argument, we note that, at the limit, " (0, n) ¼ 1). In that sense, the adaptation cost and the degree of final product differentiation play a symmetrical role in the model.
The economic interpretation of the previous result provides some explanation as to why the deregulation of the Dutch construction industry has prompted a move away from the minimal differentiation that used to 13 In constrast with proposition 3, proposition 4 holds even when t ! t max . Corner solutions in the production stages obtain in the partition (n À 2, 0) if
In such cases, all suppliers select variety a and none of them finds it profitable to produce for variety b. A final producer switching to variety b would thus make zero profit, meaning that minimal differentiation is still an equilibrium. Proposition 4 also holds for odd values of m and n. Note that " t t(, n) is an increasing function of n and is independent of m.
prevail. As Voordijk, de Haan, and Joosten (2000, 217) report, 'Deregulation of the building market has had far-reaching consequences for manufacturers, contractors and architects. Until recently, these parties tended not to produce for final customers, but to meet governmental regulations. Manufacturers and contractors had little contact with the final customer or user of the product. However, new regulation has given final users of buildings much more freedom to choose their materials. Project developers give full space to final customers to choose the products to be placed inside and outside the building. The increasing influence of final users has resulted in an increase in the variety of products and buildings demanded.' This effect of deregulation can be seen in our model as an exogenous reduction of (i.e., an increase in the ability to differentiate products). As just explained, a decrease in (for a given value of t) makes an equilibrium with minimal differentiation less likely.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the softening effect of product differentiation on price competition in a model of successive oligopolies with two varieties. Final producers select the variety that they sell on a final market. Suppliers specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for the production of one particular variety of the final product. They incur an extra cost when they produce for the other variety.
We show that the larger the number of final producers that select one variety, the larger the number of suppliers that specialize in the input specific to that variety, and vice-versa. Hence, final producers face the following trade-off. By selecting the variety that is less popular among final producers, they soften the competition and therefore increase their profits. This is the product differentiation effect that is emphasized in the economics and marketing literature. However, this choice is also associated with a low pool of suppliers and high input costs, which decreases profits. This so-called network effect is similar to the 'cost linkage' identified in the new economic geography literature (see, e.g., Venables 1996) . In this paper we examine the balance between these two effects in a three-stage model where product positioning decisions (which variety to produce or to design the intermediate good for) precede production decisions (how much of the intermediate and final goods to produce).
We prove that there exists always at least one equilibrium in the variety choice game. Multiple equilibria might also occur. We study in detail two prominent equilibrium candidates, namely, minimal and maximal differentiation. Under minimal differentiation, final producers and suppliers are unanimous in choosing a single variety. This is an equilibrium, provided that we are in the presence of a large enough extra cost of adapting one input to the other variety than the one it is designed for. Conversely, under maximal differentiation, final producers and suppliers split equally between the two varieties. This situation is always an equilibrium (as long as there is an even number of firms in each industry). We also establish that equilibria with partial differentiation (i.e., the two varieties are chosen by positive and unequal numbers of final producers) might also exist.
The model developed in this paper has been kept as simple as possible in order to highlight the interplay between the variety choices in the two vertically linked industries. Despite the relative simplicity of our three-stage game, we have not been able to fully characterize the set of its equilibria. We have nonetheless highlighted the major implications of endogenous input costs (existence of asymmetric and multiple equilibria). More than an acknowledgment of partial failure, we have here a clear demonstration of the complexity and significance of the strategic interaction addressed in the model. We believe this should fuel further research on the topic, and we suggest, therefore, some extensions of the model.
A first direction for further research would be to investigate the variety choices that would result were firms able to coordinate. As a matter of fact, what drives our results is that the decision of a final producer to deviate from a specified strategy will not take into account the effect of its deviation on the decisions taken by the other final producers and by the suppliers. Accordingly, a final producer does not take into account the effects of its deviation on the input prices. Coordination could be achieved through vertical arrangements between final producers and suppliers (e.g., vertical integration, formation of 'production networks,' or more generally, all forms of 'supply chain management'). The issue of foreclosure could then be addressed (as in Choi and Yi 2000) . Coordination could also take place horizontally, among firms within the same industry. Preliminary investigations in this respect are inconclusive (see Belleflamme and Toulemonde 2000) , which calls for further research.
We could also let final producers produce the two differentiated varieties if they so wish (in other words, final producers would have access to the same type of flexible manufacturing systems we assume suppliers are using). The decision to produce another variety (or other varieties) in addition to the initial one can be seen as a movement towards mass customization (i.e., the provision of such a range of products that nearly everyone can find what they want). But customization is likely to increase production costs in a similar way as in our model. As Alford, Sackett, and Nelder (2000) report about the automotive industry, 'The desire to offer customers numerous choices of appearance, performance, comfort, safety and security is at the expense of escalating complexity and cost in assembly and the supply chain.'
Note that for Á m 0 and Á n > 0, it is easily checked that t ba (Á n , Á m ) < t ab (Á n , Á m ). Since candidate equilibria require Á n ! À 2 and Á m ! À 2, 15 a sufficient condition for x ab and x ba to be positive for all these partitions is
For the first value of t, x ab ¼ 0 in the worst case, where Á n ¼ n À 2 and Á m ¼ À 2; for the second value of t, x ba ¼ 0 in the worst case, where
Note that the corner solutions to the system (A1) to (A4) (with x ab ¼ 0 and/or x ba ¼ 0) can be found in the working paper version of the paper.
A.1.2 Profits
We can compute equilibrium profits in the upstream industry using the following generic expressions:
where w a and w b are given in (3) and (4) Since y a ¼ Y a /n a and y b ¼ Y b /n b we can also compute equilibrium profits in the final producers' industry:
A.1.3 Conditions for Nash equilibrium Using the expressions of second-stage equilibrium profits (with interior solutions), we can develop conditions (
where
Properties of F and Y:
(The proofs of properties (i) to (iii) are straightforward. The proofs of the other properties are available upon request from the authors).
A.2 Proof of propositions
To ease the demonstrations, the propositions are proved in an order that does not correspond to the order in which they appear in the main text. Demonstrations also use some of the properties presented in section A.1.3.
A.2.1 Proof of lemma 1 By property (iv) of section A.1.3, we have that È(Á n ) ! 0 has the sign of (Á n À 1). It follows that D(Á n ) has also the same sign as (Á n À 1). This implies that for Á n ! 1, condition Da requires that Á m be greater than a non-negative bound. Hence, there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium in which a particular variety is chosen by a majority of final producers and a minority of suppliers.
The proof that this result holds for any value of t is more tedious and can be found in the working paper version of the paper.
A.2.2 Proof of proposition 3 Take Á n ¼ 0. Conditions Ua and Ub can be rewritten as À1 Á m 1, while conditions Da and Db boil down to [m(2 À t)(1 À )] È(0) tÁ m [m(2 À t)(1 À )] È(2). With m even, both are true only for Á m ¼ 0, since we know from property (ii) in section A.1.3 that È(0) ¼ ÀÈ(2) < 0. Now take Á m ¼ 0. We know from lemma 1 that equilibria are possible only for Á n ! 0. We also know from property (iv) in section A.1.3 that, with n even, È(Á n ) > 0 for Á n > 0. Hence, condition Da can be met only for Á n ¼ 0.
Proof of proposition 4
For minimal differentiation to be a variety choice equilibrium in both industries, only conditions Ua and Da have to be met. With Á m ¼ m and Á n ¼ n, these two conditions translate as
It is easy to see that the second inequality (which ensures no deviation in the upstream industry) reduces to m 2/t, which is clearly satisfied for t < t max . On the other hand, developing the first inequality, we have m ! m(2 À t)(1 À ) t 4(n À 1)(n À ) 4(1 þ )n 2 þ 4(3 À 2 )n À 4(1 À ) , t ! (n À 1)(n À )(1 À ) n(n þ 1) " t t(, n):
6.2.4. Proof of proposition 2 (i) Existence. According to proposition 3, maximal differentiation (Á m ¼ Á n ¼ 0) is a variety choice equilibrium for all admissible values of t and . This trivially guarantees existence of an equilibrium, at least for m and n even. The proof of existence when m or n are odd is tedious and can be found in the working paper version of the paper.
(ii) At most three equilibria. Maximal differentiation (Á m ¼ 0 and Á n ¼ 0) is always an equilibrium. What are the other equilibria? Let us first examine the conditions for an equilibrium at Á n ¼ 2. From property (vi), we know that U(Á n ) and U(Á n ) go up with Á n at an increasing rate. From property (vii), we know that D(Á n ) and D(Á n ) go up at a decreasing rate. If U(2) > D(2), there is no other equilibrium with 0 < Á n < n and 0 < Á m < n because the lower bound U increases at a faster rate than the upper bound " D D. The only other equilibrium candidate is minimal differentiation in the upstream or in both industries. Thus, there is at most two equilibria: maximal differentiation and minimal differentiation in the upstream or in both industries.
If U(2) < D(2), it is possible to have another equilibrium with 0 < Á n < n and 0 < Á m < m. Let us denote such an equilibrium (Á . From property (vi), we know that U(Á n ) goes up with Á n at an increasing rate. From property (vii), we know that D(Á n ) goes up at a decreasing rate. Two cases are possible.
First, U(Á * n þ 2) > D(Á * n þ 2). This inequality will hold for any Á n > Á * n . Thus, there is no other equilibrium with Á * n < Á n < n. The only other equilibrium candidate is minimal differentiation in the upstream or in both industries.
Second, U(Á * n þ 2) < D(Á * n þ 2). Potentially, there is another equilibrium at Á n ¼ Á . In that case, there can be another equilibrium at Á n ¼ Á * n þ 4. We can then repeat the exercise with Á n ¼ Á * n þ k where k is a multiple of 2. Suppose that U(Á * n þ k) > D(Á * n þ k) and that k is the lowest value that fulfils this inequality. Then, the equilibria are included in the interval ½Á * n , Á * n þ k. Therefore, there are at most, three (zones of) equilibria: maximal differentiation, minimal differentiation in the upstream or in both industries, and partial differentiation.
